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Abstract—The aim of this work is to evaluate the SEE sensitiv-
ity of a multi-core processor having implemented ECC and parity
in their cache memories. Two different application scenarios are
studied. The first one configures the multi-core in Asymmetric
Multi-Processing mode running a memory-bound application,
whereas the second one uses the Symmetric Multi-Processsing
mode running a CPU-bound application. The experiments were
validated through radiation ground testing performed with 14
MeV neutrons on the Freescale P2041 multi-core manufactured
in 45nm SOI technology. A deep analysis of the observed errors in
cache memories was carried-out in order to reveal vulnerabilities
in the cache protection mechanisms. Critical zones like tag
addresses were affected during the experiments. In addition,
the results show that the sensitivity strongly depends on the
application and the multi-processsing mode used.
Index Terms—Accelerated testing, AMP, Multi-core, SEE,
SEFI, SEU, Soft Error, SOI, SMP
I. INTRODUCTION
AVIONICS and spacecraft applications requiredeterminism and robustness in their reactive embedded
systems. The current technological trend in embedded systems
is the use of multi-core processors in order to satisfy the
growing demand of performance and reliability without
a critical increase of power consumption. The inherent
redundancy capability of multi-core architectures makes
them ideal for implementing fault-tolerant mechanisms [1].
Moreover, these devices provide a great flexibility because
they allow implementing different multi-processing modes
and programming paradigms. Hence, avionics and spacecraft
industries are interested in validating the use of multi-core
and many-core devices for their applications [2], [3].
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The continuous technology scaling in integrated circuits
makes them more sensitive to the effects of natural radiation
such as Single Event Effects (SEEs) [4]. For this reason,
physical designers are continuously searching for new methods
to improve manufacturing technologies to reduce SEE conse-
quences. For instance, Silicon-On-Insulator (SOI) technology
has been proved to be less sensitive than CMOS bulk technol-
ogy [5].
On the other side, additional hardware implementations have
been added to multi-core architectures for improving their
reliability. Examples of these protection mechanisms are the
implementation of Error Correcting Code (ECC) and parity in
cache memories. Hamming codes are very useful to mitigate
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) since they can detect double
errors and correct single ones. Nevertheless, new hardware
introduces an extra area with the corresponding increase in
power comsumption and performance degradation [6].
The use of cache memories reduces the memory access
time, thereby increasing substantially the performance of the
system. However, enabling caches implies the increase of
sensitive area and thus, the reduction of system reliability.
Therefore, a trade-off between performance and reliability is
needed depending on the application.
Given the significant importance that represents the use of
multi-core and many-core processors for avionics and safety-
critical applications, it is mandatory to evaluate their sensitivity
to SEEs, and particularly to SEUs. The present work aims at
evaluating the sensitivity to neutron radiation of a 45nm SOI
multi-core processor. Two main contributions are presented:
The first one is the determination of the static cross section
of a device implementing Error Correcting Code (ECC) and
parity (that cannot be deactivated) in their caches. The second
one is the evaluation of the neutron radiation sensitivity of the
studied multi-core working in two different multi-processing
modes running parallel aplications.
For achieving the mentioned contributions, static and dy-
namic tests were carried out with a neutron beam of 14
MeV to obtain the corresponding cross-sections. Concerning
the dynamic tests, two operating modes were explored. The
Asymmetric Multi-Processing Mode (AMP) without operating
system (OS) was used in order to test specific sensitive
hardware resources, such as cache memories and registers.
On the other hand, the Symmetric Multi-Processing Mode
(SMP) was implemented to test the resources used by the
embedded Linux SDK V1.6 OS. Experimental results show
the relationship between the system reliability and the multi-
processing mode used.
A preliminary version of this work was presented in [7]. The
present work provides a detailed description of the adopted
approach, the results regarding the errors not detected by
the studied multi-core architecture, and a deep analysis of
the experimental results including the probable causes of the
observed errors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents the related work. Section III describes the adopted
approach that has been used to evaluate the intrinsic sensitivity
of the multi-core and its dynamic response. Section IV details
the experimental setup. Section V presents and analyzes the
results issued from neutron ground testing. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper and provides some directions for future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
Several interesting works dealing with the sensitivity of
electronic components can be found in the literature. Reference
[8] summarizes the sensitivity to SEEs induced by neutrons
of different integrated circuits (i.e., SRAMs, microprocessors
and FPGAs) applicable to avionics. However, there are very
few works available regarding multi-core and many-core pro-
cessors sensitivity.
In [9] is presented a significant work that establishes a
dynamic cross-section model for a multi-core server based on
quad-core processors in 45nm bulk CMOS technology. Also,
it provides a fault handling comparison between Windows 5.2
and Linux 5.1 operating systems.
Reference [10] presents the radiation sensitivity evaluation
of a modern Graphic Processing Units (GPUs) designed in
28nm technology node, and composed by an array of stream-
ing multi-processors which share the L2 cache memory. It
also provides a hardening strategy based on Duplication with
Comparison.
Authors of [11] propose to disable the cache memories of
high-end processsors in safety-critical applications in order to
gain in reliability in spite of the increase of the execution
time. An accurate analysis of the effects of soft errors in the
instruction and data caches is also presented.
The work presented in [12] demonstrates that, by enabling
L1 cache, it is possible to improve the performance of the
system without compromising the reliability. A generic metric
(Mean Workload Between Failures) taking into account both
cross section and exposure time was introduced to evaluate the
reliability of a embedded processor devoted to execute safe-
critical applications.
III. ADOPTED APPROACH
A. Static Sensitivity
To estimate the intrinsic sensitivity of the accessible mem-
ory cells of the multi-core processor, the neutron static cross-
section σSTATIC was obtained. Typically, the method used
to obtain σSTATIC consists in writing a predefined pattern in
the memory locations and registers, and checking it along the
radiation experiments to detect errors.
However, since the cache memories on the target device
implement protection mechanisms that cannot be deactivated,
this method is not suitable as it is. This can be explained
due to the fact that single-bit errors in a word are not visible
while reading memory locations because whenever they occur,
they are corrected by either the ECC or the cache invalidation
mechanisms. It was thus necessary to use a complementary
technique based on machine-check error report for logging
data that have been corrupted during the radiation experiments.
In processors including machine-check error report, it is
possible to enable an interrupt routine for reporting errors. The
information about the errors is saved in some special-purpose
registers of the device. By reading these registers, one can
know the type of error ocurred, address, data, as well as the
obtained and calculated ECCs.
For this test, the multi-core processor was configured in
AMP mode without OS in order to have independence in
the execution of each core when performing the self-testing
of their cache memories. In addition, the L1, L2 and L3
caches, as well as the machine-check error report of each core
must be enabled. In order to simplify the interpretation of the
results due to cache coherence mechanisms, the self-testing
application was configured so that each core reads from and
writes to different sections of the main memory. Each section
has the same size as the L2 cache. In the particular case of the
L3 cache, only the core 0 was configured to use it, preventing
other cores to access it.
B. Dynamic Response
For evaluating the reliability of the target device when an
application is running, the dynamic cross section (σDYN ) has
been obtained. The motivation is to observe to what extent
the dynamic chip response depends on the application and
the multi-processing paradigm implemented. Thus, the SMP
and AMP multi-processing modes were both adopted in this
experiment.
In SMP mode, a single OS that runs on all the cores is
responsible for achieving parallelism in the application. It
dynamically distributes the tasks among the cores, manages
the organization of task completion, and controls the shared
resources. In AMP mode, the cores run independently of each
other, with or without OS. Also, they have their own private
memory space, although there is a common infrastructure for
inter-core communications. Hence, AMP mode is very useful
Figure 1. Schemes of AMP and SMP processing modes
when working with embedded systems [13]. Figure 1 depicts
these two Multi-Processing modes.
Concerning dynamic tests, two different scenarios were
considered. On the one hand, a memory-bound application
was implemented when the processor operates in AMP mode
without OS to evaluate the sensitivity of memory resources.
On the other hand, a CPU-bound application was implemented
when the processor operates in SMP mode in order to maxi-
mize the use of CPU resources and scheduling. In both cases,
errors detected by the application and by the machine check-
error report were considered in order to evaluate the sensitivity
of the target device. In the SMP scenario, it was necessary
to modify the original traps code in the kernel and in the
u-boot of the Linux OS. The traps code is the code that is
executed by the system when an exception or a fault occurs.
In this approach, this section of code was modified to log
all the events detected by the machine-check error report.
Also, in the case of a L2 cache error detection, the L2 error
registers values were logged to obtain more details about the
error. It is important to note that, the original traps code
logs the recoverable and unrecoverable conditions that cause
a machine-check exception. If the condition is recoverable by
the machine check, then it returns to the previous state and its
operation is resumed.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Neutron Radiation Facility
The radiation ground tests were conducted at the GENEPI2
(GEnerator of NEutron Pulsed and Intense) facility located at
the LPSC (Laboratoire de Physique Subatomique et Cosmolo-
gie) in Grenoble, France [14]. This accelerator was originally
developed for nuclear physics experiments, and recently it
has been used to irradiate integrated circuits from different
technologies.
From the target, neutrons are emitted in all directions. The
Device Under Test (DUT) is set facing directly the target at a
distance determined to adjust the neutron flux. While the DUT
is fully exposed to neutrons, a dedicated neutron shielding can
be used to protect the readout electronic platform.
Neutrons are produced with an average energy of 14 MeV.
For the radiation campaigns, it was considered, to first ap-
proximation, that only neutrons emitted fully forward will
impact the DUT. In this case, the neutron energy is maximal
at 15 MeV. Reference [15] discusses the relevance of using 14
MeV neutron test to characterize the SEU sensitivity of digital
devices.
Neutron production is monitored throughout the experi-
ments to determine the neutron dose for each irradiation. An
online Si detector, located within the beam pipe 1 meter up-
stream of the target, collects the recoil particles backscattered
from the target during the fusion reaction.
Early 2015, a fresh T target was installed, generating a
maximum neutron flux of 4.5 × 107 n · cm−2 · s−1. For the
radiation tests presented in this work, the flux was limited to
2× 105 n · cm−2 · s−1.
B. Device Under Test
The target device was a Freescale P2041 multi-core proces-
sor which is inside the P2041RDB design board [16]. The
multi-core is based on four e500mc cores built on Power
Architectures technology and manufactured in 45nm SOI
technology. This quad-core can operate up to 1.5 GHz and
includes a three-level cache hierarchy. The e500mc core is a
32-bit superscalar processor that includes independent on-chip
32 KB L1 caches for instruction and data, and a unified 128
KB backside L2 cache. Additionally, the P2041 includes a
1024 KB L3 cache shared among the four cores. Table I gives
details about the sensitive areas of the multi-core processor
that were targeted during the radiation campaigns.
The e500mc processor implements an L1 instruction and
data cache with automatic cache invalidation when a parity
error is detected. Both the L2 backside cache and the L3 shared
frontside cache are protected with configurable ECC or parity
for the data array, and parity for the tag array. This architecture
corrects single bit errors and detects multiple-bit ones [17].
Figure 2 depicts the memory architecture of the studied multi-
core processor.
Figure 2. Scheme of the memory architecture of the multi-core processor
For the experimental tests, the cores were configured in
write shadow mode. In this mode, all modified data in the
L1 cache is written through into the L2 cache. This ensures
that, if data or parity tags are corrupted in the L1 cache, it
Table I
SENSITIVE AREAS OF THE P2041 MULTI-CORE PROCESSOR
Sensitive zone Location Capacity Description
L1 Cores 0, 1, 2, 3 32 KB / D and 32 KB / I per core Data / Instruction Cache
L2 Cores 0, 1, 2, 3 128 KB per core Backside Unified Cache
L3 Multi-core 1024 KB per chip Frontside cache
GPR Cores 0, 1, 2, 3 32 registers of 32 bits General purpose register
FPR Cores 0, 1, 2, 3 32 registers of 64 bits Floating point register
can be invalidated and repopulated with the valid data from
the rest of the memory hierarchy [17]. For logging all the
SEEs occurred during the radiation experiments, the machine-
check error interrupt and the Cache Error Checking bits were
enabled.
C. Tested Applications
In the first scenario, for evaluating the dynamic response
of the studied multi-core processor, a memory-bound 80x80
Matrix Multiplication (MM) algorithm was implemented. In
this case, the device was configured in AMP mode, where each
core executes independently the same matrix multiplication (C
=AxB) and compares its results with a predefined value in
order to identify errors. The size of the matrix was selected in
order to maintain a trade-off between the amount of memory
used and the execution time. The matrices A, B and C were
located in consecutive memory vectors. Matrix A was filled
up with 1’s and B was filled up with 2’s, thus the expected
result was 160 for all the elements of matrix C. The matrices
were filled up with fixed values in order to simplify the data
analysis since a known value helps to identify which bit or
bits have been changed during the test. In this way, MBUs
(Multiple Bit Upsets) and MCUs (Multiple Cell Upsets) can
be easily detected. It is important to note that the results of
the experiment are totally independent of the input values, no
matter the particle produces a bit flip in a fixed or random
value.
In the second scenario, the CPU-bound application Travel-
ling Salesman Problem (TSP) for 16 cities was implemented.
Its execution was distributed among all the cores. The multi-
core processor was configured in SMP mode in which the OS
manages the resources in order to maximize the processing
capacity of the cores. The parallel implementation of the TSP
application makes this benchmark intrinsically fault-tolerant
since, if one core is stopped by any reason, another core
could find the correct result. The source code of this parallel
implementation was an adapted version of the one used in
[18]. An application based on Linux PTRACE-Process trace
functions was implemented to monitor parallel applications
and their related processes.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Static Cross Section
A first radiation campaign was carried out for obtaining
the multi-core static cross-section. The device under test was
placed facing the center of the target perpendicularly to the
beam axis at a distance of ∼ 19.1 cm. The neutron beam
energy was 14MeV with a flux of ∼ 1.96×105 n ·cm−2 ·s−1
at a 500 Hz frequency. The cross section is defined as:
σ =
Number of Upsets
F luence
(1)
58 SEEs were detected within 2 hours of exposure time
. Among them, 46 were SEUs and 12 Single Event Func-
tional Interrupts (SEFIs). There were no errors in general and
floating point registers. Table II summarizes the results of this
campaign.
In this experiment, all the SEEs were considered errors no
matter they were detected by the machine-check error report
or by the self-testing application. Then, the obtained static
cross-section is:
σSTATIC =
58
1.41× 109 = 4.11× 10
−8 cm
2
device
(2)
Due to the scarcity of experimental data (58 SEEs), it is
compulsory to add uncertainty margins to these results. For
numerous events (typically >100), the Poisson distribution
can be used to calculate such margins. However, in this
situation the most accurate and universal way to calculate the
uncertainty margins consists in using the relationship between
the cumulative distribution functions of the Poisson and chi-
squared distributions as described in [19], [20]. Therefore, the
following equation has been applied:
1
2
χ2(
α
2
, 2Nerr) < µ <
1
2
χ2(1− α
2
, 2(Nerr + 1)) (3)
where χ2(p, n) is the quantile function of the chi-square
distribution witn n degrees of freedom, α is a parameter that
defines the 100(1-α) percent confidence interval, and Nerr is
the number of errors detected.
For a 95 % confidence interval (α = 0.05), the lower and
upper limits for the static cross section are:
3.12× 10−8 cm
2
device
< σSTATIC < 5.32× 10−8 cm
2
device
(4)
Since the accessible registers and memory cells of the multi-
core processor represent about 1.47× 107 bits, the confidence
interval for the static cross section per bit is estimated as
[2.12 − 3.62] × 10−15 cm2/bit. Reference [9] provides the
estimation of the bit cross section for a 45nm CMOS tech-
nology processor (1 × 10−14 cm2/bit) for neutrons with the
same energy. From these results, it can be seen that 45nm
SOI technology is between three and five times less sensitive
to SEEs than its CMOS counterpart.
Errors in L1, L2 and L3 caches, both in data arrays and
cache tags were detected by the machine-check error report.
In addition, it was observed a SEFI (depicted in Table II as
"Other errors") that provoked a system hang simultaneously
in all the cores. This event lead to several errors logged by the
self-testing application running on the processors that showed
data different from the original word (0×55AA55AA) written
in the memory. From these errors, two types of patterns were
identified.
Table II
RESULTS OF THE STATIC RADIATION CAMPAIGN
SEE Type Type of error Occurrences Consequences
SEU L1 Data parity 9 None
SEU L2 Single-bit ECC 29 None
SEFI L2 Tag parity 5 Hang
SEU Multiple L2 errors 1 None
SEU L3 Single-bit ECC 7 None
SEFI L3 Multiple-bit ECC 6 Hang
SEFI Other errors 1 Hang
Total 58
The first one consists of a set of fourteen words with
consecutive addresses containing 0×DEADBEEF as data.
Table III presents the main memory space used by each
core (Columns 2 and 3) and the address ranges where this
pattern was replicated. The second pattern constitutes scattered
clusters of errors of four words each. In each of them,
the first word contained 0×DEADBEEF , the second one
0 × 20200044, the third one 0 × 00130000 and the last one
0 × 00006000. Table IV summarizes the replications of this
pattern, as well as the involved addresses.
Table III
MAIN MEMORY SPACE AND DETAILS OF THE FIRST PATTERN OF ERRORS
DURING THE STATIC TEST
Core Start Addr End Addr Range 1 Range 2 Range 3
0 0x10000 0x30000 0x16548 - 0x14cc8 - 0x16ac8 -
0x1657c 0x14cfc 0x16afc
1 0x40000 0x60000 0x46048 - 0x463c8 - 0x46908 -
0x4607c 0x463fc 0x4693c
2 0x70000 0x90000 0x76048 - 0x76388 - 0x76908 -
0x7607c 0x763bc 0x7693c
3 0x100000 0x120000 0x106048 - 0x1063c8 - 0x106908 -
0x10607c 0x1063fc 0x10693c
Table IV
DETAILS OF SECOND PATTERN OF ERRORS DURING THE STATIC TEST
Core No. Ocurrence 1st Word 2nd Word 3rd Word 4th WordAddr Addr Addr Addr
0
1 0x10000 0x10004 0x10008 0x10024
2 0x16000 0x16004 0x16008 0x16024
3 0x16200 0x16204 0x16208 0x16224
4 0x16600 0x16604 0x16608 0x16624
1
5 0x42000 0x42004 0x42008 0x42024
6 0x46380 0x46384 0x46388 0x463a4
7 0x46440 0x46444 0x46448 0x46464
2
8 0x72000 0x72004 0x72008 0x72024
9 0x763c0 0x763c4 0x763c8 0x763e4
10 0x76440 0x76444 0x76448 0x76464
11 0x7c000 0x7c004 0x7c008 0x7c024
3
12 0x102000 0x102004 0x102008 0x102024
13 0x106380 0x106384 0x106388 0x1063a4
14 0x106440 0x106444 0x106448 0x106464
Due to the fact that errors have occurred simultaneously
and the observed pattern is repeated among the cores, it is
presumed that a particle perturbed a shared resource of the
chip. Because of the nature of these errors, it is suggested
that the affected resource was a register belonging to the
CoreNet Coherency Fabric (CCF), which is the connectivity
infrastructure of the multi-core system.
B. Sensitivity of the P2041 in AMP Scenario
A second radiation test campaign was carried out to obtain
the dynamic cross section in AMP scenario (σDYN_AMP ).
The device was again set at a distance of ∼ 19.1 cm from
the target. The neutron energy was 14 Mev with a flux of
∼ 1.96×105 n ·cm−2 ·s−1 at a 500 Hz frequency. Two tests,
each one lasting 2 hours were performed.
Table V shows that L1, L2 and L3 caches were all perturbed
by neutrons. The Load Instruction and Instruction fetch errors
are the most critical ones since they provoked processor hang.
Table V
RESULTS OF RADIATION EXPERIMENTS FOR THE P2041 WORKING IN
AMP SCENARIO
SEE Type Type of error Test 1 Test 2 Consequences
SEFI Load Instruction 1 0 Hang
SEU L1 Data parity 19 17 None
SEU L2 Single-bit ECC 9 20 None
SEFI L2 Tag parity 0 4 Hang
SEU 3 1 None
SEU Multiple L2 errors 3 1 None
SEU L3 Single-bit ECC 3 2 None
SEFI Instruction fetch 0 1 Hang
MBU Other errors 6 0 App. result error
Total 44 46
Half of the observed L2 Tag parity errors lead to processor
hang. L1 Data cache parity errors are not critical since L1
cache is invalidated when parity fails. Finally, L2 and L3
Single-bit errors are not critical as the ECC corrects them.
Briefly, there were one SEFI in Test 1 and five SEFIs in
Test 2 that caused system hangs. In addition, six events in
Test 1 provoked errors in the results of the application, but
they were not detected by the multi-core machine-check error
report. This puts in evidence that errors were produced by
Multiple Bit Upsets (MBUs) involving not only data, but also
parity information. A deeper analysis has allowed to identify
the origin and multiplicity of these events. Four of them were
clusters of errors whereas the other two were single data errors.
1) Clusters of Errors: Three clusters of errors occurred
in Core 2, and one in Core 1. All of them were very
closely related and they were detected in the same read cycle.
Each cluster involves exactly 16 consecutive positions of the
resulting matrix. Each matrix element was an integer value (4
bytes). In all cases, an incorrect result of "2" was observed
instead of the expected "160".
Considering that:
• The e500mc processor features a set associative L1 cache
memory organized as 64 sets of 8 blocks with 64 bytes
in each cache line.
• The L2 cache memory is organized as 256 sets of 8 blocks
of 64-byte cache lines [16].
• The number of consecutive corrupted addresses exactly
matches the size of the cache line in the processor
architecture.
• The physical addresses involved in each cluster corre-
spond to a cache block.
Then, it is clear that the cluster of errors was produced by an
upset affecting the cache address tag. It could be explained as
follows: Upon reading the involved addresses which have Line
Tag T stored in Set S, the cache hardware retrieves incorrect
data instead of fetching the correct values from the main
memory because a tag belonging to this set S was corrupted
and became that precise tag T . Figure 3 depicts the clusters of
errors observed in Core 2 assuming that the particle affected
the L1 cache. Two of them had line tag 0× 403DD and the
other one 0× 403DE.
The persistence of 2’s in these errors indicates that the
Figure 3. Clusters of errors attributed to undetected tag errors. Note that in
(a), the main memory is depicted by blocks of 64 Bytes. A main memory
address (36 bits) comprises cache tag (24 bits), set (6 bits) and word position
(6 bits). Also, note that the matrices A, B and C do not start exactly at the
beginning of an address line that the cache refers to.
cache had already been filled up with the contents of matrix
B. Taking into account the data address mapping shown
in Figure 3 (a), any line tag comprised in the interval
(0× 403D6− 0× 403DC) (matrix B) could have become
the cluster error line tag. Comparing the tags of the clusters
of errors with each one of the tags in the previous interval,
it was possible to detect a MBU affecting bits b1 and b2 due
to their physical adjacency. For the three cases the tags had
to be changed (from 0 × 403DB to 0 × 403DD and from
0×403D8 to 0×403DE). These errors were not detected by
the parity protection mechanisms since parity bit remains the
same. Note that the L1 cache implements only one parity bit
per tag.
Thus, in the authors’ opinion, a particle modified two
consecutive bits (MBU) belonging to three different tags
(Multiple Cell Upset with multiplicity of three). Moreover,
when decoding the corrupted addresses, it was possible to
determine that the cache lines in Sets 0 × 1A, 0 × 1E and
0×20 were affected. The fact that even and quasi-consecutive
sets in cache were involved, gives clues about the possible 3-D
implementation of the caches.
Finally, the cluster of errors observed in Core 1 appears in
the line tag 0 × 203DD set 0 × 1B. Following the previous
analysis it is possible to verify that the particle has also
changed the bits b1 and b2 of the line tag 0 × 203DB set
0×1B becoming the line tag 0×203DD. This perturbation in
the cache was not detected since the parity remains the same.
This cluster of errors may have been produced by a MBU,
or it was probably related to the clusters of errors occured in
Core 2 due to their similarities, in which case the mentioned
MCU would have multiplicity of 4.
2) Single Errors: Two separated matrix-result data were
corrupted from "160" to "162" in Core 2, at addresses
0×403DF380 and 0×403DF480 respectively. Since the same
bit (b1) was corrupted in both addresses and the difference
between them is 0× 100, it is very likely that they constitute
an MCU. Also, this distance suggests that memory interleaving
probably involves memory blocks of 256 addresses. These
events were not detected by the parity protection which
indicates that the parity bit was corrupted as well. Note that the
L1 data cache implements one-bit-per-byte parity checking.
To conclude, the occurrences of application errors and hangs
are evidences that the ECC and Tag parity mechanisms are not
enough to guarantee the immunity of the cache memories.
The errors obtained during tests 1 and 2 described in Table
V were added in order to have the total number of errors
occurred within 4 hours of irradiation. The device was exposed
to a fluence of 2.82×109n·cm−2. In this experiment the total
number of SEEs was 90 and, among them 12 produced errors
(application errors and hangs). Applying Equations (1) and
(3) for a confidence level of 0.95, the dynamic cross-section
in AMP scenario without OS is:
2.17×10−9 cm
2
device
< σDYN_AMP < 7.33×10−9 cm
2
device
(5)
C. Sensitivity of the P2041 in SMP Scenario
Three additional radiation campaigns were carried out
to calculate the dynamic cross section in SMP scenario
(σDYN_SMP ). In the first campaign the code was loaded from
the NOR flash memory provided in the design board. During
the test, the application definitely stopped due to a fatal crash
in the OS after only 22 minutes. When a reboot of the system
was performed, the image of the OS could not be loaded since
the NOR flash memory was corrupted as well. Once, the OS
image was restored, the test continues but a fatal crash in
the OS occurred again after 28 minutes, giving a total test
time of 50 minutes. That is the reason why for the other
two campaigns the OS image was loaded from a hard disk.
The second and the third campaign lasted one and four hours
respectively. Table VI shows the characteristics of the radiation
test campaigns.
Table VII summarizes the obtained results for the three
tests. The fault classification was done based on the OS fault-
handling messages and the monitor application. Faults with
multiple indications were scored at the most critical level. The
Table VI
TEST CAMPAIGNS CHARACTERISTICS FOR SMP SCENARIO
Test Flux Time Fluence
Campaign [n · cm−2 · s−1] [min] [n · cm−2]
Test 1 ∼ 1.96× 105 50 6.00× 108
Test 2 ∼ 1.62× 105 60 5.83× 108
Test 3 ∼ 1.45× 105 240 20.88× 108
order of the rows in this table depends on the criticity of the
fault, being the last one the most critical. It is important to
note that the results include the messages obtained during the
execution of the application and during the idle time.
Table VII
RESULTS OF RADIATION EXPERIMENTS FOR THE P2041 WORKING IN
SMP SCENARIO
SEE Type of OS fault Test1 Test2 Test3 Consequences
Type
SEU Machine Check 6 10 53 None
exception - Cache 0 0 1 Unreliable sys.
SEU Machine check 0 0 1 None
exception - Code lost 1 2 0 Timeout
SEU Other error 1 0 0 Timeout
messages 0 0 1 Unreliable sys.
SEU Abnormal process 6 3 11 Timeout
termination 2 3 22 Unreliable sys.
SEFI System hang 3 3 17 System crash
SEFI Automatic system 1 1 8 System crash
restart
Total 20 22 114
Most of the Machine Check Exceptions (MCEs) were pro-
duced by errors affecting the cache memories. When the
condition exception was recoverable by the system, there were
no consequences neither in the application nor in the system.
However, there was one case in which a system process of the
scheduler was affected. A Machine check exception - Code
lost occurs when the MCE routine has lost the raised error
code that has provoked the exception; consequently there is
no possibility to determine the source of the error.
An Abnormal process termination occurs when the monitor
detects a timeout in the application, or when the MCE logs an
exception in kernel code which causes an unreliable system
condition. A System hang is produced when the system shell
do not respond to any command, or when the MCE logs
a message showing that a rebooting is needed. In the most
critical level, the MCE logs an Automatic system restart
message. Finally, there were errors that did not come either
from the MCE or the monitor application. They were classified
as Other error messages and have caused, in one case an
application timeout, and in the other case a killing of a system
process.
To estimate the dynamic cross-section, only faults that led to
unreliable system condition, application timeouts and system
crashes were considered. The total number of events for the
three tests was 156, and among them 86 produced errors. The
total fluence was 3.27 × 109n · cm−2. Applying Equations
(1) and (3) for a confidence level of 0.95, the dynamic cross
Figure 4. Relationship between error source and OS fault
section in SMP scenario is:
2.10×10−8 cm
2
device
< σDYN_SMP < 3.25×10−8 cm
2
device
(6)
The machine-check-error report and the traps implemented
in the OS allowed determining the source of the errors of
these faults. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the
OS faults and the hardware source of the error. It is important
to note that the dynamic cross section is strongly dependent on
the characteristics of the tested scenario. The obtained results
show that around of 70% of the errors affects the system while
the other 30% affects the application itself. It can be explained,
since this scenario maximizes the use of CPU resources and
scheduling, and the TSP implementation has an intrinsic fault-
tolerant capability.
D. Comparison of SEEs consequences in the two dynamic
scenarios
The SEEs consequences issued from the two dynamic
scenarios are shown in Figure 5. In the AMP-memory-bound
86.67% of the events had no consequences, 6.67% provoked
errors in the user application, and 6.67% caused system hangs.
On the other hand, in the SMP-CPU-bound scenario 44.87%
of the observed events had no consequences on the system or
application, 13.46 % of the events provoked timeouts of the
user application, 20.51% of the events caused an unreliable
condition in system and 21.15% crashed the system. Table VIII
summarizes the uncertainty margins of the SEEs consequences
for the two dynamic scenarios with a 0.95 confidence level.
A comparison of both dynamic cross sections (σDYN_AMP )
and (σDYN_SMP ) shows that the dynamic response of the
device depends not only on the application but also on the
adopted multi-processing mode. Moreover, the obtained results
revealed that errors may occur in SMP mode, even if the OS
is in idle mode.
In the literature, there is a work that compares the per-
formance of the SMP and AMP modes both with operating
systems for a dual-core giving as a conclusion that SMP
Table VIII
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF SEES CONSEQUENCES
Consequence Type AMP-MM SMP-TSP
None [ 62 - 97 ] [ 55 - 88 ]
Timeout [ 0 - 4 ] [ 13 - 32 ]
Unreliable system N/A [ 22 - 45 ]
System crash [ 2 - 13 ] [ 23 - 46 ]
App. result error [ 2 - 6 ] [ 0 - 4 ]
Total [ 72 - 110 ] [ 132 - 182 ]
Figure 5. SEE consequences according to the scenario implemented. The
confidence intervals are shown by means of the red lines.
outperforms the AMP mode [21]. Inferring this affirmation
to the present work, it is possible to suggest the existence of
a trade-off between reliability and performance according to
the multi-processsing mode selected.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work has evaluated the sensitivity to 14 MeV neutrons
of a 45nm SOI P2041 multi-core processor. From the static test
results, it can be seen that 45 nm SOI technology is between 3
and 5 times less sensitive to neutron radiation than its CMOS
counterpart.
The dynamic AMP tests have demonstrated that in spite
of the parity and ECC protection mechanisms, errors have
been occured in the application results. A deeper analysis has
allowed to determine that errors were caused by MBUs in the
address tags and data.
Results presented in section V-D suggest that the studied
multi-core working in AMP scenario without OS is at least five
times less sensitive to SEEs than working in SMP scenario.
The main reason is that AMP scenario exploits fewer chip
resources than SMP scenario.
In future work, a similar approach will be applied for
other multi-core and many-core circuits with different memory
architectures.
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